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overnmental openness and accountability are essential to the 
proper functioning of a democratic society.  At one point in 
history, monarchy was the dominant form of government in 
Europe, and some monarchies tried to justify their existence through 
the concept of “Divine Right,”1 the idea that kings were placed on their 
thrones by God, were divinely inspired and guided, and were carrying 
out God’s will through their actions.2  Of course, to the extent that 
monarchs really were carrying out God’s will, concepts like openness, 
transparency and democratic accountability had no role.  After all, why 
would society allow common people to criticize what God has done, 
or allow them to rebuke the monarch for carrying out God’s choices 
and actions? 
With the dawn of the Enlightenment, and the influence of writers such 
as John Locke,3 Thomas Paine4 and Baron de Montesquieu,5 the 
concept of Divine Right fell into disrepute,6 and an entirely new 
understanding of government and governmental authority began to 
emerge.  In the United States, this new understanding was reflected in 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence7 which implicitly rejects the 
concept of Divine Right, and declares the primacy of democratic 
                                                
1 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (noting that “centuries ago” there 
was a “belief that the monarch served by divine right”). 
2 See id. 
3 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689); JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS 
CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE (1664). 
4 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 3 (1776) (Dover ed. 1997). 
5 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151-152 (Cosimo Edition 2011). 
6 See Paine, supra note 4, at 6 (“There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition 
of monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act 
in cases where the highest judgment is required.”).  Thomas Paine, who was British born, but 
who was in the American colonies during the Revolutionary period and who wrote extensively, 
expressed serious reservations regarding the British monarchy’s claim to rule by Divine Right: 
“no man in his senses can say that their claim (the British monarchs’ claim to the throne) under 
William the Conqueror is a very honorable one.  A French bastard landing with an armed 
banditti, and establishing himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain 
terms a very paltry rascally original.  – It certainly hath no divinity in it.”  Id., at 13-14. 
7 U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (July 4, 1776). 
G 
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principles: “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”8 
As democratic governance has gained ascendance in Western societies, 
it is now understood that the concept of the “consent of the governed” 
contains two essential elements.  First, a free and democratic society 
must be premised on the right to freedom of expression.9  If the 
citizenry is free to decide who they will vote for, and which ideas or 
propositions to support and promote, they must be free to 
communicate their ideas with each other, and to attempt to persuade 
others to their positions.10  Second, the people must have access to 
information regarding the functioning of government.  It is difficult to 
have meaningful democratic participation, or democratic 
accountability, when the government conceals information from the 
public, and starves the public of information regarding its 
functioning.11 
This article provides a short evaluation of the status of openness and 
transparency in the United States.  As we shall see, while the U.S. has 
made significant strides towards creating a government that is more 
open and transparent, and more consistent with democratic ideals, the 
U.S. government falls far short of that ideal in important respects. 
§ 1 – U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY 
Unquestionably, the U.S. government is far more open and transparent 
than it was a century ago.  Prior to the 1930s, neither the federal 
government, nor state governments, were subject to much in the way 
of transparency requirements.  For example, even though the U.S. 
Constitution requires that “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
                                                
8 Id. 
9 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 
(1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 
(1963); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REV. 245; 
RUSSELL L. WEAVER, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10-13 (5th ed. 2014). 
10 See id. 
11 See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 89 (2006) (“The current rules on open government are 
for the most part mainly a question of public hygiene. This regulation is intended to increase 
the transparency of public administration, with a view to better democratic control and social 
accountability of government.”); Katherine McFate, Keynote Address: The Power of an Informed 
Public, 38 VT. L. REV. 809, 825 (“Access to information is an important tool of  democratic 
accountability. Governments need information to provide citizens with protection from 
harmful products and practices. Citizens need to understand what their government is doing 
in their name.”). 
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United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for,” be confirmed only with the “advice and consent” of the U.S. 
Senate,12 for most of U.S. history these confirmation hearings were 
closed to the public.13   In addition, prior to the 1930s, administrative 
agencies were not required to publish proposed rules or regulations, 
much less their policy positions and choices, so that the process for 
promulgating rules and regulations was neither open nor transparent.14  
Commonly, agencies would simply announce and implement their 
regulatory wishes. 
The U.S. government started moving towards greater openness and 
transparency in the early part of the twentieth century.  The movement 
began with U.S. Senate’s processes for considering nominations to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  About a hundred years ago, the U.S. Senate 
decided to break with tradition and hold confirmation hearings in 
public.15  The results of that openness have been interesting and 
enlightening.  Although a number of confirmation hearings had been 
contentious prior to the twentieth century, the public became more 
interested and involved once the proceedings became public.16  As the 
public began to realize that judicial views are important to the outcome 
of cases, the public began to galvanize both for and against particular 
nominees.17  As a result, when Robert Bork was nominated to the U.S. 
Supreme Court,18  public scrutiny of his nomination was intense, 
focusing on his positions on such hot button issues as abortion and 
privacy.19  Interest groups immediately galvanized and actively 
                                                
12 U.S. CONST., Art. II, cl. 2, sec. 2: 
[2] He [The President] shall have Power, . . . by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the 
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, to the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
13 See RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR 
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, 1789-2011 10 (2011) [hereafter BETH & PALMER]. 
14 See WILLIAM E. FUNK, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 740 
(West, 5th ed., 2014) (hereafter FUNK, SHAPRIO & WEAVER). 
15 See Beth & Palmer, supra note 12, at 10. 
16 Id. at 10-11. 
17 Id. 
18 See Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk: The Bork Nomination; In No Time At All, Both 
Proponents and Opponents are Ready For Battle, The New York Times A24 (July 9, 1987). 
19 See Philip Shenon, The Bork Hearings: Poll Finds Public Opposition to Bork is Growing, The New 
York Times A20 (Sept. 24, 1987) (“A growing number of Americans are expressing an 
unfavorable opinion of Judge Robert H. Bork after his week long testimony at Senate hearings 
on his nomination to the Supreme Court, a New York Times/CBS News Poll shows.  The 
poll did not look to determine why more people were responding unfavorably to Judge Bork. 
But it seemed clear that it was an effect of the confirmation hearings last week, in which the 
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opposed his nomination.20  They were concerned about Bork’s 
positions on civil rights,21 as well as his position on abortion.22  Indeed, 
interest groups had anticipated the Bork nomination and had begun 
researching his record some time prior to his nomination.23 
Attempts to influence Senate confirmation proceedings have now 
become commonplace.  As a result, when an individual is nominated 
to the judiciary, interest groups opposed to the nomination mobilize 
in an effort to influence the Senate and thwart the nomination,24 and 
they use a variety of tactics, including researching nominees’ positions, 
lobbying Senators, providing information to the media, arranging 
television advertising campaigns, sending opposition mailings, and 
organizing constituent letters and phone calls.25   The Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings provide a good example.  When he was 
nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court, there were questions regarding 
whether he had sexually harassed a former subordinate employee at 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the 
confirmation process involved lengthy and public hearings.26  Despite 
considerable testimony against Thomas, most senators ultimately 
decided to give Thomas the benefit of the doubt.27 
The next major step towards openness and transparency occurred 
when the U.S. Congress adopted the first major piece of “open 
government” legislation, the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),28 in the 1930s.  With the adoption of that act, agencies were no 
longer free to unilaterally adopt regulatory changes without consulting 
the public or regulated entities.29  The APA established two different 
types of procedures for creating rules, “formal” processes and 
“informal” processes.30  The APA required that formal rules, also 
known as “adjudicative rules,” must be created by “trial-type” 
                                                
judge reaffirmed his opposition to Supreme Court decisions upholding abortion rights and 
personal privacy.”). 
20 See Greenhouse, supra note 17. 
21 Id. 
22 See Andrew Rosenthal, Bork Gives Abortion Rights Convention Something to Shout About, The New 
York Times A12 (July 13, 1987). 
23 See Greenhouse, supra note 17. 
24 Id. at 14; see also Neil A. Lewis, Gay Rights Groups Join Opposition to Ashcroft for Justice Department, 
The New York Times A15 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
25 See id.   
26 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 298 (5th ed. 2008). 
27 Id. 
28 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. 
29 See FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, supra note 13, at 740. 
30 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
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procedures, involving subpoenas, offers, of proof, etc.31  Although 
formal procedures continue to exist, very few agencies use that process 
because it is regarded as too difficult and too cumbersome.  Most U.S. 
administrative agencies create virtually all rules and regulations using 
so-called informal procedures which require agencies to begin the 
promulgation process by publishing a NOPR (notice of proposed 
rulemaking) in the Federal Register,32 thereby providing the public with 
notice of the proposed rule.33  The NOPR must contain various items 
of information, including “(1) a statement of the time, place, and 
nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal 
authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 
issues involved.”34  In addition to allowing interested parties the 
opportunity to comment on NOPRs,35 and requiring the agency to 
“consider” those comments,36 the APA also requires agencies to issue 
a “concise general statement” of the “basis and purpose” of any final 
rule that it issues.37  However, the APA exempts various types of 
information from its rulemaking processes.38  
As with the U.S. Supreme Court’s confirmation processes, adoption of 
the the APA’s rulemaking procedures have led to greater citizen 
involvement.  When administrative agencies propose a new rule or 
regulation, it is not at all uncommon for affected individuals and 
entities to offer comments, and sometimes to offer changes or 
amendments.  In some instances, regulated entities mobilize (much as 
they do in response to U.S. Supreme Court nominations), and present 
detailed arguments both for and against proposed regulatory changes.39   
                                                
31 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557. 
32 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
33 Id. at § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise 
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.”). 
34 Id.  
35Id. at § 553(c) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons 
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at § 553. 
38 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(1) &(2), and (b)(3)(A) & (B). 
39 See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 7, 96 (2000) (“Rulemaking 
certainly did not rein the agencies in. It is true, as McNollgast argue, that notice and comment 
provided an opportunity for congressional constituencies to mobilize against the EPA's, 
FDA's, and OCC's rules. But, as the examples show, the procedure also provided public 
interest groups, health organizations, and academic researchers opportunities to register their 
data and arguments in the agencies' rulemaking record.”). 
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The APA also promoted openness because it required administrative 
agencies to voluntarily disclose various types of information to the 
public, including “interpretative rules and statements of policy.”40  
However, even though the APA was beneficial, in that it was designed 
to require agencies to voluntarily disclose information to the public, 
the disclosure obligations were limited to certain types of information 
(e.g., certain documents related to rulemakings, interpretations and 
policy statements), but did not create a general right of access to agency 
documents.41  Moreover, the obligation to publish interpretative rules 
and statements of policy was frequently ignored by administrative 
agencies without consequence,42 even though FOIA (as discussed in 
more detail later) purports to impose sanctions on agency’s that fail to 
satisfy their disclosure obligations. 
Congress has also enacted other pieces of legislation designed to 
promote openness and transparency.  For example, beginning in the 
1960s, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),43 
which gives individuals and corporations a right of access to 
information held by the U.S. government.  FOIA is a “disclosure” 
statute because Congress assumed that government would disclose 
rather than conceal documents.44  FOIA specifically states that “upon 
any request for records which reasonably describes such records and 
is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees 
(if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records 
promptly available to any person.”45  Agencies are required to decide 
within twenty days whether to comply with a request.46  However, the 
time limit can be tolled if the agency requests additional information, 
or as necessary to clarify the applicability of fees.47  If the agency fails 
to comply with the applicable time limits, it cannot require the 
requesting party to pay search fees absent “unusual or exceptional 
circumstances.”48 
Although FOIA is a disclosure statute, it does not require disclosure 
of all governmental documents.  Indeed, despite the assumption of 
disclosure, FOIA explicitly allows administrative agencies to withhold 
various types of information from disclosure, including classified 
                                                
40 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
41 See FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, supra note 13, at 740. 
42 See JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, § 6.05 at 6-19 (2d ed. 1995). 
43 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
44 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
47 Id. at § 552(a)(6)(A)(1) & (2). 
48 Id.  
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information, internal agency rules and practices, information 
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; private commercial 
or trade secret information, inter-agency or intra-agency privileged 
communications, personnel, medical, or similar files the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy; 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, information 
related to reports for or by an agency involved in regulating financial 
institutions, and geological information concerning wells.49 
In addition to the APA and FOIA, Congress has also enacted the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),50 the Government in the 
Sunshine Act,51 and amendments to FOIA.52  Both statutes were 
designed to enhance governmental openness and transparency.  In 
addition, many state legislatures have adopted their own open records 
provisions that are similar to FOIA.53   
§ 2 – SHORTCOMINGS IN THE U.S. SYSTEM 
Despite the advances towards openness and transparency that have 
occurred in the U.S., the ability of Americans to participate in the 
governmental process is undercut by a significant lack of transparency.  
There are many different reasons for these problems. 
Regarding FOIA, I have detailed its shortcomings more fully 
elsewhere.54  To briefly recap, there are numerous problems with 
FOIA, including the fact that many agencies do not fully and 
completely comply with FOIA’s requirements,55 do not create indices 
of their adjudicatory decisions,56 do not comply with FOIA’s 
production deadlines,57 and suffer from “substantial FOI request 
backlogs that preclude timely determinations.”58  There are various 
reasons for these problems, including a lack of sufficient funding,59 and 
                                                
49 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
50 5 U.S.C. app. §§1-15 (2000) (enacted 1972). 
51 5 U.S.C. s 552b(b), (h) (1994). 
52 See FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, supra note 13, at 667-668. 
53  Kentucky Open Records Act, KRS 61.878(1)(h). 
54 See R. Weaver, Congress and Transparency, in IRÈNE BOUHADANA, WILLIAM GILLES & IRIS 
NGUYEN-DUY, PARLIAMENTS IN THE OPEN GOVERNMENT ERA ___ (2015) (forthcoming). 
55 See FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, supra note 13, at 742. 
56 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: NONCOMPLIANCE 
WITH AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS (1986). 
57 See FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, supra note 13, at 742. 
58 Id. 
59 See Michael E. Tankersley, How the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1966 
Update Public Access for the Information Age, 50 AD. L. REV. 421, 423 (1998). 
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a lack of adequate systems60 so that the “public has no efficient and 
accurate way of learning what information the agency has [and no idea] 
how the files are arranged, how long they are kept, or where they are 
stored.”61  Although Congress has amended FOIA,62 in an effort to 
solve some of these problems, many difficulties remain.63 
The more serious difficulty today is that the U.S. suffers from major 
“transparency gaps.”  In other words, even though government has 
enacted various pieces of legislation designed to promote greater 
openness and transparency, the government has maintained secrecy 
regarding major aspects of its operations.64  In particular, the 
government has been operating a massive and secret cybersurveillance 
operation.65  Had it not been for Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor 
who stole and released thousands of National Security Agency (NSA) 
documents,66 the American people might never have known about the 
size and scope of the cybersurveillance program.67  
The size of the NSA surveillance and collection program is absolutely 
staggering,68 with the NSA spending some $10.8 billion per year69 and 
maintaining a staff of some 35,000 employees.70 The NSA was 
systematically collecting data about virtually everyone, including 
millions of cell phone call records, e-mails, text messages, credit card 
purchase records and information from social media networks.71  In 
addition, the NSA created a system (muscular) that enabled it to easily 
                                                
60 See id. at 424. 
61 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV. FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT REINVENTION TEAM, GATEWAY TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION at 11 
(1995). 
62 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. II 1996)). 
63 See Tankersley, supra note 63, at 450. 
64 For a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of this program, and its democratic 
implications, see Russell L. Weaver, Cybersurveillance in a Free Society, ___ WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
___ (2015). 
65 See Doug Stanglin; Snowden Says NSA Can Tap Email Chats, The Courier-Journal, A3 (Aug. 1, 
2013); Shane Scott, Disclosures on NSA, Surveillance Put Awkward Light on Previous Denials, N.Y. 
Times, Jun. 12, 2013, at A. 18. 
66 See Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming NSA: From Spying on Leader of U.N. 
to tracking Drug Deals, on Ethos of ‘Why Not?’, The New York Times, A10 (Nov. 13, 2013); Doug 
Stanglin; Snowden Says NSA Can Tap Email Chats, The Courier-Journal, A3 (Aug. 1, 2013). 
67 E.g., Scott, supra note 66, at A18. 
68 See Shane, supra note 67, at A10. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at A10; see also Peter Maass, How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets, The New 
York Times, § MM (Aug. 13, 2013); Charlie Savage, C.I.A. Ties to AT&T’s Add Another Side to 
Spy Debate, International Herald Tribune, A5 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
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access Yahoo and Google accounts.72  The end result was that the NSA 
intercepted some 182 million communication records, including “to” 
and “from” e-mail information, as well as text, audio and video 
information.73   
From the perspective of openness, transparency and democratic 
accountability, the NSA program was particularly disturbing.  
Undoubtedly, government has an interest in shielding aspects of the 
program from public view.  After all, if the goal is to discover and 
thwart potential terrorists, the government cannot reveal its 
investigative processes so that potential terrorists become familiar with 
the nation’s surveillance methods, and are able to evade them.  The 
difficulty is that the NSA program was shrouded in almost complete 
secrecy without any semblance of democratic accountability. 
Not only was there a lack of transparency, U.S. governmental officials 
affirmatively misled the nation regarding the nature, size and scope of 
the NSA program.  For example, President Obama assured the U.S. 
public that the NSA was not targeting ordinary U.S. citizens, but rather 
was focused only on individuals who posed a terrorist threat to the 
United States, including communications of “foreign intelligence 
value”74 and foreign intelligence targets.75  President Obama boldly 
proclaimed, “Nobody is listening to your telephone calls.”76  Likewise, 
the NSA declared that it was not collecting and storing private online 
or phone information except under limited circumstances: when it 
believed that the recording or transcript contained “foreign intelligence 
information,” evidence of a possible crime, a “threat of serious harm 
to life or property,” or that shed “light on technical issues like 
encryption or vulnerability to cyber attacks.”77  However, it soon 
became clear that many of these statements were untrue.  The NSA 
had established a huge data collection and storage center (taking 
advantage of the declining cost of data storage and advances in search 
software sophistication),78 and was routinely collecting extraordinarily 
                                                
72 See Barton Gellman &Ashkan Soltani, NSA Hacks Yahoo, Google: Global Data Links Expose 
Untold Millions of Accounts, The Courier-Journal, A-1 (Oct. 31, 2013). 
73 See Martha Mendoza, Reagan’s Order Led to NSA’s Broader Spying, The Courier-Journal, A10, c. 
1-6 (Nov. 24, 2013).  
74 See Scott Shane, Documents Detail Restrictions on N.S.A. Surveillance, The New York Times A9 
(June 21, 2014); see also Mendoza, supra note 74, at A10. 
75 Id. 
76 See Documents Detail Restrictions, supra note 75. 
77 Id. 
78 See Scott Shane & David E. Sanger, Job Title Key to Inner Access Held by Leaker, The New York 
Times A1 (July 1, 2013).. 
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large amounts of information.79  As a result, even if Americans were 
not the intended targets of NSA eavesdropping, they routinely fell 
“into the agency's global net.”80 
The NSA cultivated secrecy in a variety of ways.  The government 
issued National Security Letters to large telecommunications 
companies, requiring them to turn over data to the NSA, and ordering 
the companies not to publicly acknowledge the letters or the 
disclosures, or even alert their customers regarding the nature and 
scope of NSA inquiries.81  NSA Search warrants were (and are) issued 
by secret courts and the warrants and the court orders were (and are) 
classified as “secret” and withheld from the public.  To the extent that 
individuals tried to challenge the surveillance program in court, the 
courts refused to consider the cases because litigants could not prove 
that the government was actually surveilling them (what a surprise 
given the secrecy of the program?), and thereby could not establish 
standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.82  For those 
who made FOIA requests, those requests would have been denied on 
the basis that information regarding the program was “classified” and 
“secret” and therefore privileged.83   In other words, secrecy rather 
than transparency was the norm.   
The tendency towards secrecy even led governmental officials to 
deceive Congress (and the public) regarding the scope of the program.   
In particular, NSA Director, James Clapper lied to Congress about the 
program.84  When he was directly asked whether the NSA was 
collecting "any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions 
of Americans," he flatly stated, "No, sir. Not wittingly.”85  Clapper later 
admitted that he lied to Congress.86 
                                                
79 See Documents Detail Restrictions, supra note 75. 
80 See id. 
81 See Shane, supra note 67, at A10; Stanglin, supra note 66, at A3. 
82 See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
83 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
84 See Editorial Board, Edward Snowden, Whistle Blower, The New York Times A18 (Jan. 2, 2014) 
(“[Snowdens’] leaks revealed that James Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, lied 
to Congress when testifying in March that the N.S.A. was not collecting data on millions of 
Americans. (There has been no discussion of punishment for that lie.)); Andrew Rosenthal, 
Clapper and Carney Get Slippery on Surveillance, The New York Times, Taking Note (Oct. 24, 2013); 
Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Leaker Denies Giving Secrets to China, The New York Times 
A5 (June 18, 2013) (suggesting that Snowden decided to go public because Director Clapper 
had lied to the American public regarding the NSA data collection program).   
85 See N.S.A. Leaker Denies Giving Secrets to China, supra note 85. 
86 See Rosenthal, supra note 85. 
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CONCLUSION 
Freedom of expression is an essential element of the democratic 
process.  In order to choose their representatives, or express their 
opinions on policy ideas or proposals, the citizeny must have the right 
to freely and openly express their beliefs.  However, in order for 
citizens to fully exercise their right to free expression, openness and 
transparency are also essential.  Unless the public has information 
regarding the functioning of government, it is impossible for the 
citizenry to fully and effectively exercise their right to freedom of 
expression.  As a result, democratic accountability is inextricably 
intertwined with transparency. 
Over the last century, the United States has made significant strides 
towards increasing openness and citizen participation.  Senate hearings 
on U.S. Supreme Court nominees, which were once held in secret, are 
now open to public participation and scrutiny.  In addition, Congress 
has passed various pieces of legislation designed to open up 
government, including the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Advisory Committe Act, and 
the Government in the Sunshine Act.  In addition, various executive 
actions have been taken to open governmental actions to scrutiny. 
Many of these efforts to increase openness have enhanced the ability 
of the citizenry to participate in the functioning of governmental 
process.  When the U.S. Senate opened confirmation hearings to the 
public, those confirmation processes became more political, and 
produced significantly more public interest and participation.  In some 
instances, that participation has led the Senate to reject nominees, or 
subject them to a heightened level of scrutiny.  Statutes like the APA 
have also increased citizen participation.  The publication of NOPRs, 
in conjunction with the enactment of administrative rule and 
regulations, have encouraged affected individuals and entities to 
submit comments and attempt to influence agency decisionmakers.  In 
other words, there is a very real and strong relationship between 
openness, freedom of expression and democratic accountability. 
Nevertheless, the progress towards open government has been halting 
and incomplete.  Even though both the APA and FOIA require 
agencies to publish various types of documents, those laws are 
frequently honored in the breach.  Moreover, although FOIA requires 
agencies to disclose various types of information on request, FOIA is 
beset by numerous exceptions, as well as delays and calculated efforts 
to avoid disclosure.  The net result has been less than perfect, and less 
than that which might otherwise be considered desirable.  As a result, 
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the goal of open government remains a work in progress in the United 
States.   
The goal of openness is further undercut by the war on terror.  As the 
cybersurveillance controversy suggests, the United States has so far 
been unable to find the proper balance between openness and secrecy.  
Although the government conducts a massive cybesurveillance 
operation, which sweeps in communications by virtually all Americans, 
the government has tried to conduct this operation in secrecy, free of 
governmental or democratic accountability.  In a free society, this level 
of secrecy is disturbing. 
 
 
